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Dallas Burtraw, Richard Sweeney, and Margaret Walls 
 
Abstract 
This paper evaluates the costs to households of a carbon dioxide (CO2) cap-and-trade program. 
We find important variation in the distribution of costs of the policy across 11 regions of the country and 
income deciles. The introduction of a price on CO2 is regressive, but this may be outweighed by the 
distribution value of CO2 emissions allowances. We evaluate five alternatives: three are progressive 
(expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit and cap-and-dividend approaches), while the others are 
neutral (reduction in payroll tax) or amplify the regressivity (reduction in income tax). Regional 
differences are most substantial for low-income households. 
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The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues 
from a Cap-and-Trade Auction 
Dallas Burtraw, Richard Sweeney, and Margaret Walls ∗ 
1. Introduction 
Federal climate policy in the U.S. is now under serious discussion with several bills 
introduced in Congress in the past two years. Cap and trade appears to be the policy instrument 
of choice and discussions now center on several key design features, not the least of which is the 
allocation of carbon allowances. Whether allowances will be fully auctioned by the government 
and how the auction revenues will be used, or whether some portion of allowances will be 
distributed for free and to whom they would be given are issues at the center of discussion. Two 
criteria to be considered in making these decisions are the impact that the policy will have on 
households and the distribution of those impacts across income groups and regions of the 
country. These issues are the focus of this paper. 
We analyze the effects in 11 regions of the country and for households sorted into annual 
income deciles. We assume the policy is enacted in 2009 and assess the impacts corresponding 
roughly to 2015. We introduce a price on CO2 emissions of $20.91 per metric ton of CO2 
(mtCO2), which is the predicted 2015 allowance price under the cap in Lieberman-Warner (S. 
2191).1  This price is expected to yield total emissions that are 18.1 percent lower than business-
as-usual emissions in 2015. We analyze five policy scenarios that all include the same emissions 
target and price but use different schemes for returning the revenues from an allowance auction. 
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These schemes include two lump-sum, or “cap and dividend” options, reductions in income and 
payroll taxes, and expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit for lower income households.  
Several studies have looked at the incidence of cap-and-trade and carbon tax policies in 
recent years (Dinan and Rogers 2002; Parry 2004; Boyce and Riddle 2007; Paltsev et al. 2007; 
Metcalf 2009; and Shammin and Bullard 2009).  These studies have estimated the impacts across 
households in different income groups, with auction or tax revenues returned in a lump-sum 
manner or in the form of reductions in income and other taxes. Some studies have also looked at 
policies that give allowances out for free (“grandfathering”). Our contribution to this literature is 
three-fold. First, we use a regionally disaggregated model of the electricity sector to more 
carefully assess the impacts on electricity prices and fuel mixes. The electricity sector is 
responsible for 40 percent of CO2 emissions and thereby concentrates much of the burden of 
carbon pricing on households. In addition, by almost all accounts, the electricity sector will be 
responsible for the bulk of the emissions reductions in the early decades of the program, thus it is 
important to carefully assess the changes that take place in that sector.  Second, we allow for 
behavioral responses to carbon pricing – again, most importantly in the electricity sector – and 
calculate consumer surplus losses rather than expenditures changes. Third, we look at the 
impacts on households in different income deciles by region of the country. Although others 
have looked at regional impacts (Hassett et al. 2009), we are the first to assess the impact by 
income group within regions. 
Putting a price on CO2 emissions can distribute costs unevenly across income groups and 
regions, and that revenue allocation decisions can either temper or exacerbate these distributional 
effects. The introduction of a price on CO2 is regressive in that it imposes a greater cost as a 
share of household income on lower-income households – a point that has been made in many 
studies and is due primarily to the larger share of income spent by lower income households on 
energy. In three policy scenarios we examine—caps with taxable or nontaxable dividends and 
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit—the allocation of revenue reverses this outcome, 
leading to progressive distributions of incidence. For example, an average household in the 
lowest income decile incurs a consumer surplus loss that is 4.42 percent of income but a taxable 
lump-sum return of revenues turns that loss into a net consumer surplus gain of 4.25 percent of 
income. An average household in the top decile, on the other hand, has a gross consumer surplus 
loss of 0.91 percent and a net loss of 0.51 percent. Expanding the EITC is even more 
progressive. On the other hand, reduction of the income tax would amplify the regressivity of 
climate policy. A reduction in the payroll tax is itself approximately neutral and would preserve 
the distributional consequences of the introduction of a price on CO2.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Hassett et al. (2009) conclude that regional differences from CO2 pricing are likely to be 
relatively small. We find that a CO2 price of $20.91 implemented with revenues returned to 
households as taxable dividends yields a loss in consumer surplus for the average household on a 
national basis of $132, but the loss ranges from $91 up to $285. When expressed as a fraction of 
income, these differences are quite small, thus our findings are similar in this way to those of 
Hassett et al. We find more substantial differences across regions for poorer households, 
especially when consumer surplus is viewed as a percentage of income. Again using cap-and-
dividend as an example, average households in the lowest two deciles may enjoy a consumer 
surplus gain up to 3.82 percent of income (Texas) or of just 1.08 percent of income (Northeast).  
 The costs we report are partial equilibrium measures. A more complete analysis would 
assess the changes in factor markets including capital formation and labor supply. For example, 
there are likely to be efficiency impacts associated with reducing preexisting distortionary taxes 
through expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit or reduction of the income and payroll 
taxes. Many public finance economists have argued the merits on efficiency grounds of using 
“green” taxes or auctioned allowances to reduce other distortionary taxes (Goulder et al. 1999; 
Parry et al. 1999). Assessing the resulting general equilibrium impacts on households by region 
and by income decile is beyond our scope in this paper. Our findings indicate, however, that 
there may be trade-offs between efficiency and equity that should be more fully explored in a 
general equilibrium setting. 
We begin by providing a brief literature review. Section 3 then discusses our data and 
methodology. Section 4 provides the results of our analysis of the impacts across income groups 
on a national basis, while Section 5 explores the regional impacts. The final section of the paper 
provides conclusions and directions for future research.  
2. Literature on Distributional Impacts of Climate Policies 
Many studies of the incidence of CO2 taxes and cap-and-trade policies have been 
published in recent years.2 Dinan and Rogers (2002) analyze the efficiency and distributional 
impacts of a cap-and-trade program aimed to reduce emissions by 15 percent. They find that the 
distributional outcome hinges crucially on whether allowances are grandfathered or auctioned 
                                                 
2 We focus here only on studies that look at CO2 taxes and cap-and-trade systems. See Parry et al. (2007) for a 
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and whether revenues from allowance auctions, or from indirect taxation of allowance rents, are 
used to cut payroll taxes or corporate taxes or provide lump-sum transfers. They also address the 
trade-offs between efficiency and distributional concerns. They find that programs that auction 
allowances and reduce corporate income taxes have the greatest potential for efficiency gains, 
whereas programs that implement lump-sum revenue recycling would realize little to no increase 
in economic efficiency.  
Several studies look at CO2 taxes and other kinds of energy taxes. Bull et al. (1994) 
compare a tax based on energy content (i.e., a Btu tax) with a tax based on carbon content. Their 
results suggest that the direct components of Btu and CO2 taxes look quite regressive on an 
annual income basis, but the indirect components are less regressive. On the basis of lifetime 
income, the direct component remains regressive, but the indirect component becomes mildly 
progressive; overall, the taxes look much less regressive on a lifetime income basis than on an 
annual income basis, which is consistent with studies of other taxes (Lyon and Schwab 1995).  
Metcalf (1999), using similar data, analyzes a revenue-neutral package of environmental 
taxes, including a CO2 tax, an increase in motor fuel taxes, taxes on various stationary source 
emissions, and a virgin materials tax. Although the taxes disproportionately hit low-income 
groups, Metcalf shows that the overall package can be made distributionally neutral  through 
careful targeting of income and payroll tax reductions. 
Parry (2004) estimates a simple, calibrated, analytical model with household income 
proxied by consumption to examine the incidence of emissions allowances, among other control 
instruments, to control power plant emissions of CO2, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxide 
(NOx). He finds that using grandfathered emissions allowances to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 
percent and NOx emissions by 30 percent can be highly regressive.  
Hassett et al. (2009) adopts the methodology of Bull et al. (1994) and Metcalf (1999) to 
analyze the effects of a CO2 tax. The authors add a regional focus and assess the impacts of the 
tax if it were enacted in 1987, 1997, and 2003. Similar to the earlier studies, they find that the 
direct component of the tax is significantly more regressive than the indirect component and that 
the regressivity is muted when lifetime income is used rather than annual income. The authors Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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find only small differences in the incidence of the tax across regions for the average household; 
they do not look at the distribution of costs across income deciles within regions.3 
Metcalf et al. (2008) assess the overall impacts of three recent CO2 tax bills introduced in 
the U.S. Congress. As part of their study, the authors calculate the tax expenditures as a fraction 
of income and report the results by annual income decile, under the assumption that revenues are 
returned in a lump-sum manner. They look at three scenarios: one in which the burden of the tax 
is fully passed forward to consumers in the form of higher energy and product prices, and two 
scenarios in which a share of the burden is borne by producers—that is, shareholders of firms.
4 
The tax alone, assuming full forward shifting, is highly regressive, but returning revenues lump 
sum makes it progressive; households in deciles 1 through 6 are actually better off with the 
policy, and only the two highest-income deciles experience a net loss. Shifting the burden back 
to shareholders also reduces the regressivity of the tax, since shareholders are predominantly in 
the higher-income groups. 
Metcalf (2009) assesses the impact of a carbon tax “swap”—a CO2 tax coupled with a 
reduction in payroll taxes. Specifically, he gives each worker in a household a tax credit equal to 
the first $560 of payroll taxes; this would be equivalent to exempting from the payroll tax the 
first $3,660 of wages per worker. Metcalf finds that this option leads to an outcome that is 
approximately distributionally neutral. He then analyzes an option that couples this rebate with 
an adjustment to Social Security payments that benefits the lowest-income households. This 
makes the CO2 policy more progressive. Finally, he compares these options with a lump-sum 
redistribution of the CO2 tax revenues and finds that this option is the most progressive of all.  
In summary, the literature indicates that it is important to look at both the direct effects of 
climate policies (i.e., the increase in the price of energy consumed by households) and the 
indirect effects (i.e., the increase in the costs of products and services for which energy is an 
input). Studies also find that the way in which revenues from a CO2 tax or auctioned allowances 
are returned to households is critically important in determining the incidence of the policy. 
Although one study finds little difference in impacts on the mean household across regions, we 
                                                 
3 Batz et al. (2007) find differences in the regional impact of climate policy to be an important consideration, but 
they do not look at income differences. They consider only direct energy use, and they use kernal regression to 
estimate effects at a local scale, thereby accounting for rural versus urban differences in consumption. 
4 The backward shifting analysis is informed by runs from the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
model. See Paltsev et al. (2007) for a description of the model. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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provide a more detailed regional analysis that accounts for the income distribution across 
regions. We also develop a more careful representation of the electricity sector, which has 
regional implications. We look at five alternative scenarios for redistributing revenues and 
reducing the impacts of CO2 pricing.  
3. Data and Methodology  
The building blocks for our analysis are expenditures at the household level as reported in 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for 2004–2006. We 
include direct energy expenditures and indirect expenditures through purchase of goods and 
services. We focus the analysis on 2015, by which time some technological, economic, and 
demographic changes can be expected even in the absence of climate policy. These changes are 
only accounted for in the transportation and electricity sectors. Transportation-related changes 
are expected to result from new corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards that will take 
effect on the basis of recent legislation and proposed regulations.5 For electricity, we use the 
Haiku electricity model maintained by Resources for the Future to associate emissions with 
electricity consumption by region and to predict changes in fuel mix and capital turnover by 
region, accounting for changes in equilibria in regional electricity markets (Paul et al. 2008). 
Beyond changes in the electricity sector, we assume that consumption patterns in 2015 for the 
baseline are the same as in 2004-2006 as reflected by the CEX data. We explain our assumptions 
for the climate policy scenarios below. 
The population sampled in the survey includes 97,519 observations for 39,839 
households; an observation equals one household in one quarter.6 The BLS builds a national 
sample, and we use their data to construct national after-tax income deciles. The numbers of 
                                                 
5 Specifically incorporated are the requirements in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act that would bring 
about a fleetwide average fuel economy of 35 miles per gallon by the 2020 model year. In May 2009, President 
Obama announced an acceleration of this policy, essentially reaching the new mandate by the 2015 model year.  
6 These numbers exclude observations in Hawaii and Alaska. Although households can remain in the data for up to 
four quarters, each quarter’s sample is designed to be independently representative. Analysis has shown that richer, 
older, homeowning households are disproportianately likely to complete all four quarters of the survey. For both of 
these reasons, we treat each individual quarter as an observation, which we annualize, as opposed to only taking 
observations that contain four quarters’ worth of data. All observations are unweighted, and straight averages are 
calculated at for each region and income decile. Though we have a large number of observations, BLS does not 
guarantee the statistiscal representativeness of its data at the state level. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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observations by region and decile are shown in Appendix A.7 Since we are interested in a finer 
level of geographic detail, we examine the data with state-level indicators. This leaves us with a 
final sample of 82,033 observations for 33,234 households in 43 states plus the District of 
Columbia.8  We aggregate the observations into 11 regions. Observations with missing state 
identifiers are still used in our calculations at the national level.  
Household direct energy expenditures include electricity, gasoline, natural gas, and 
heating oil. Using CEX data, at the national level direct expenditure on energy represents 24 
percent of annual income among the households in the lowest-income category, which is the 
greatest percentage of any group. For the highest-income households, it is only 3.6 percent. On 
average across all income groups, the share of expenditure on energy is 6.7 percent of annual 
income. Regionally, we find some differences but they are not large for average households. The 
average expenditure ranges from a low of 5.8 percent of annual income in California and the 
Northwest to a high of 7.5 percent in Texas. In dollars, average annual expenditures range from 
$3,547 in the Northwest to $4,676 in the Northeast. Categories of expenditure vary considerably 
across regions. For example, in the Northeast and the Mid-Atlantic, home heating contributes 
importantly to expenditures; electricity expenditures are substantially greater as a percentage of 
income in the South than for other regions, as are gasoline expenditures. The second category we 
incorporate is spending on energy embodied indirectly in food, durable goods, and other goods 
and services. CO2 emissions resulting from indirect energy consumption are calculated from data 
in Hassett et al. (2009), who provide information on the emissions intensity of goods aggregated 
into 38 indirect expenditure categories.9  
Table 1 displays the assumed 2015 per capita CO2 emissions by category in the baseline. 
All categories except electricity are based on 2004-2006 CEX data and emissions intensities. For 
electricity, emissions are based on 2015 Haiku estimates allowing for supply and demand side 
                                                 
7 We distribute regional observations based on the CEX data into these national income deciles. These income 
“buckets” do not necessarily accurately represent regional income deciles; rather, they are constructed as deciles at 
the national level. 
8 BLS refers to observations as “consumer units,” which we loosely interpret as households. BLS cannot preserve 
the confidentiality of its respondents when samples get small, so 15,486 observations (6,605 households) have 
missing state identifiers. Compared with the population as a whole, the missing observations are unevenly 
distributed toward the lower end of the income distribution. Five states—Iowa, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Vermont, and Wyoming—fall out of the data entirely due to missing observations. 
9 Hassett et al. update methods developed by Metcalf (1999) that have been the basis for similar calculations 
elsewhere in the literature (Dinan and Rogers 2002; Boyce and Riddle 2007). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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adjustments. Total calculated emissions equal 15.03. We compare this to a forecast for national 
emissions of 19.10 mtCO2 that consists of EIA estimates for the non-electricity sectors and 
Haiku model estimates for electricity. Approximately 2.68 mtCO2 of this difference are from the 
public sector—that is, from direct and indirect energy consumption by federal, state, and local 
governments. The difference is indicated as missing.  





EIA Total Elasticity Source
Direct
Electricity 2.76 14.4% -0.32 Haiku*
Natural Gas 1.09 5.7% -0.20 Dahl (1993)
Gasoline 4.60 24.1% -0.10 Hughes et al. 
(2008)
Fuel Oil 0.43 2.3% -0.20 Dahl (1993)
Indirect
Food 1.31 6.8% -0.63 Tellis (1988)
Services 1.49 7.8% -1.00 Boyce and Riddle 
(2008)
Air Travel 0.19 1.0% -0.25 Boyce and Riddle 
(2008)
Industrial Goods 0.86 4.5% -1.23 Tellis (1988)
Auto 2.25 11.8% -1.30 Boyce and Riddle 
(2008)
Other Transportation 0.04 0.2% -0.25 Boyce and Riddle 
(2008)
Total Calculated Emissions  15.03 78.6%
2.68 14.0% 0.00 Assumption
Missing** 1.40 7.3%
Estimated 2015 Emissions 19.1
** Missing emissions are the difference between the EIA total and Calculated emissions total.  Discrepancy 
is due to the use of Haiku emissions intensity to calculate emissions in electricity from expenditure data
* Note: For the electricity sector, this elasticity represents the equilibrium percent change in quantities for a 
percent change in equilibrium prices
Government (Implied) 
Note: Electricity emissions reflect estimated 2015 emissions based on Haiku.  All other categories reflect 
2004-2006 CEX consumption times assumed carbon intensity.  2006 actual per capital emissions were 20.2 
according to EIA.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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To understand how household expenditures would be affected by climate policy, we use 
the estimate of the embodied CO2 content of expenditures and the incremental change in 
expenditures that would result from a price on CO2 emissions. For natural gas, fuel oil, and 
gasoline, the carbon content and resulting CO2 emissions are fixed numbers. For electricity, the 
effect of climate policy is more complicated. The Haiku model solves for electricity market 
equilibria accounting for price-sensitive demand, electricity transmission between regions and 
changes in electricity supply, including changes in capacity investment and retirement over a 25-
year horizon and system operation for three seasons of the year (spring and fall are combined) 
and four times of day. The model solves for 21 regions of the country, which are mapped into the 
11 regions in this analysis.  The model indicates that changes in electricity prices and 
expenditures differ significantly by region (see Table 2).  





Emissions Per MWh 
of Generation
Post-Cap CO2 








0.583 0.464 13% -5%
California CA 0.170 0.166 7% -2%
Texas TX 0.549 0.549 15% -5%
Florida FL 0.538 0.448 15% -4%
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, OH, 
WV, WI
0.794 0.654 27% -8%
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 0.573 0.512 18% -3%
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 0.372 0.317 12% -4%
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 0.344 0.195 8% -3%
New York NY 0.308 0.288 16% -1%
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 0.835 0.749 20% -9%
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 0.627 0.471 18% -7%
National 0.596 0.492 16% -5%
Haiku Modeling ResultsResources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 1 displays the CO2 emissions per capita for direct and indirect fuel purchases for 
our baseline 2015 scenario. Panel A shows the average household in each income group at the 
national level and Panel B shows the average household for each region. The emissions indicated 
as missing in Table 1 are attributed proportionally to all uses of energy except electricity (where 
we rely on our Haiku estimates). Note that the average per capita emissions of 16.4 mtCO2, 
shown by the line in the graph in each panel exclude government emissions and incorporate 
implementation of the new vehicle CAFE standard and some changes in electricity markets 
captured by the Haiku model expected to occur in the baseline by 2015.  
The expenditures for direct fuel purchases are distributed fairly evenly across income 
groups. The big difference emerges in the indirect expenditure category, where high-income 
households spend significantly more than low-income households. Panel B shows significant 
differences across regions in the types of direct expenditures for fuels. The variation in emissions 
from the electricity sector is particularly noteworthy. The figure indicates emissions associated 
with production in each region, with California being dramatically lower than other regions. In 
our subsequent calculations, we use the electricity model to calculate the effect on prices 
associated with consumption by region, accounting for power transmission between regions and 
other issues. The change in prices is the important metric for assessing the effect on households. 
 
Figure 1. Emissions (mtCO2) per Capita, by Alternative Measures 
Panel A. Income Decile                                           Panel B. Region 
 
Note:  Figures exclude government emissions, reflect adjustments for CAFE and the use of Haiku for the electricity 
sector. 
Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism of placing a price on CO2 emissions through the 
introduction of a cap-and-trade policy. The horizontal axis in the graph is the reduction in Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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emissions (moving to the right implies lower emissions), and the upward-sloping curve is the 
incremental resource cost of a schedule of measures to reduce emissions; thus, it sketches out the 
marginal abatement cost curve. The triangular area under the marginal cost curve up to the 
emissions target is the cost of resources used to achieve emission reductions and the rectangle is 
the value of emissions allowances. EIA’s analysis of S.2191 provides an estimate of the 
aggregate cost, i.e., these two areas shown on the graph, along with a breakdown of costs among 
sectors. Although we treat the electricity sector separately, using the Haiku model to obtain 
changes in emissions due to the CO2 price (see table 2), all other sectors’ reductions and costs are 
assumed to match EIA.  
 
Figure 2. Resource Cost and Allowance Value in CO2 Cap-and-Trade Program 
The CO2 price leads to demand reduction and a consumer surplus loss estimated under 
linear demand curves with own-price elasticities reported in Table 1. Using baseline emissions 
intensity estimates, the emission reductions associated with the reduction in demand 
underestimates the true emissions reductions and overestimates the cost that would result if 
process changes and other substitution possibilities were modeled as they presumably are in 
EIA’s analysis. Thus to match EIA’s cost estimate outside the electricity sector, we scale the 
consumer surplus losses to the sum of the resource cost and the allowance value, which is the 
total cost of the policy, across all non-electricity goods.10 
                                                 
10 This exercise does not materially affect our distributional findings. It does, however, provide for cost numbers 
that have meaning in the policy debate and can be compared to estimates by others of the costs to households of cap 
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This approach implicitly assumes that all changes in costs are fully passed through to 
consumers in every industry. In the long run, production technology is usually characterized as 
constant returns to scale, which implies that consumers bear the cost of policy. The electricity 
sector is special because of the long-lived nature of capital in the sector. Nonetheless, even in 
this sector consumers are expected to bear eight times the cost borne by producers (Burtraw and 
Palmer 2008). The degree to which the burden of any tax is shared between consumers and 
producers has been the focus of previous studies but is outside our scope here. As mentioned 
above, Metcalf et al. (2008) assess the distributional impacts of a carbon tax under alternative 
assumptions about the share of burden borne by consumers and producers. 
4. Results for Policy Scenarios 
The value of emissions allowances that are available for some purpose is equal to the 
price per mtCO2 times the resulting tons of emissions. The emissions cap is expected to result in 
per capita emissions of 17.15 mtCO2. This includes 1.50 mtCO2 of offsets, which account for 8.7 
percent of the allowance value. An additional 14.8 percent is dedicated to paying for government 
emissions (including resources necessary to pay for emissions reductions). This leaves 76.5 
percent of the allowance value, or $274 per capita available as disbursable revenue.  
We group our revenue scenarios into two categories, cap-and-dividend options and 
changes to preexisting taxes. In the first group are two cap-and-dividend options—one in which 
the dividend is subject to income taxes and one in which it is not. In the second group, we 
consider a reduction in income taxes, a reduction in payroll taxes, and expansion of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. In each of the options, the revenues generated from the allowances used to 
cover all nongovernment emissions are returned to households according to the individual policy 
prescription. The one exception is the Earned Income Tax Credit; in this option, we assume the 
credit is increased by 50 percent above its current level, which leads to “leftover” revenue that is 
returned in a lump-sum manner as in the (taxable) cap-and-dividend case.  
Table 3 shows consumer surplus loss as a percent of income for the average household in 
each income decile before and after the redistribution of revenues for each policy (see appendix 
H for breakdown by region and decile). Negative numbers in the table refer to a consumer 
surplus gain and positive numbers are a loss. It is clear from the table that the alternative 
mechanisms for rebating have very different distributional effects. We discuss each in turn in the 
following sections, along with the results by region. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
13 
4.1 Cap-and-Dividend (Lump-Sum Transfers) 
One straightforward remedy to alleviate the regressivity of the CO2 policy would be to 
return the CO2 revenue to households on a per capita basis. This approach recently has been 
referred to as cap-and-dividend (Boyce and Riddle 2007) and previously was known as “sky 
trust” (Kopp et al. 1999; Barnes 2001). In principle, the government would auction the emissions 
allowances and return the auction revenues in a lump-sum manner to each person. The revenues 
are equal to the price of emissions allowances multiplied by the quantity. Using information 
from the CEX, we identify the number of persons per household in each income group in each 
region and calculate a per capita dividend payment to redistribute to each household. In our first 
scenario, people are assumed to pay personal income taxes on the dividends; in the next scenario, 
we consider a dividend that is not taxed. 11  
4.1.1 Taxed Dividends 
The net effect of the cap-and-taxable dividend policy is shown in the second row of Table 
3 and in Figure 3. The left-hand-side of Figure 3 graphs the results shown in Table 3, i.e., it 
illustrates the incidence of the policy, in consumer surplus loss as a fraction of annual income, on 
the average household in each income group. The Suits Indexes and the CO2 allowance price are 
also listed. The typical Suits Index is calculated by plotting the relationship between cumulative 
tax paid and cumulative income earned and comparing the area under this curve with the area 
under a proportional line. The index is bounded by –1 and 1, with values less than zero 
connoting regressivity, and values greater than zero, progressivity; a proportional tax has a Suits 
Index of zero (Suits 1977). We modify the standard interpretation to measure the incidence on 
households according to their loss in consumer surplus rather than taxes paid. We also calculate a 
Suits Index for the rebate of revenue raised from cap-and-trade. In this case, the analysis is the 
same, but the sign interpretation is reversed, with negative values indicating progressivity. The 
darker bars in the graph represent the loss in consumer surplus as a share of after-tax income, 
without accounting for the revenues. The bars with the lighter shading represent the incidence of 
the policy after distributing the value of allowances as a per capita dividend.  
                                                 
11 Since our results are derived in a partial equilibrium setting, we do not consider any effects that this lump-sum 
payment would have on household expenditures. However, recent evidence from the behavioral economics literature 
suggests that consumers are unlikely to factor the expectation of such payments into their short-run energy 
consumption decisions (Sunstein and Thaler 2008).  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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The graph clearly shows that households in the lowest deciles see a dramatic 
improvement in their well-being as a result of the lump-sum dividend of allowance revenues. 
The average household in decile 1 incurs a consumer surplus loss of 4.42 percent of income 
without the dividend but gets a consumer surplus gain equal to 4.25 percent with the dividend. 
The figure also shows that households in all deciles benefit from the lump-sum return of 
revenues. Although households in the higher income deciles do not experience a net gain, on 
average, they do incur a much smaller loss as a result of the rebate. The Suits Index from the tax 
is –0.20, indicating that the CO2 price is regressive; however, the Suits Index from the rebate is  
–0.40, which is strongly progressive. On net, the graph makes it clear that the cap-and-dividend 
option is a progressive policy.  
Figure 3. Cap-and-Dividend (Taxable) 
 
The table portion of the figure shows the regional results. Positive numbers in the table 
indicate a loss and negative numbers indicate a gain, consistent with the graph. The important 
take-away messages from the table are the relatively small variation in impacts across regions for 
average households and the larger differences for households in deciles 1 and 2. The average 
household in California and the Northwest has a consumer surplus loss equal to 0.15 percent of Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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income ($106 in California and $91 in the Northwest), while in the Plains, an average household 
has a consumer surplus loss of 0.43 percent ($273). By contrast, an average household in the 
bottom two deciles in Texas experiences a consumer surplus gain of $361, or 3.82 percent of 
income, on average, whereas households in this same income group in the Northeast gain $87, or 
1.08 percent of income.  
4.1.2 Nontaxable Dividends 
It is not clear whether CO2 allowance dividends in a new cap-and-trade program would 
be treated as taxable or nontaxable income. In this scenario, we treat the dividends as untaxed, 
similar to the 2008 federal tax rebates, which were also untaxed. 
The third row of Table 3 and Figure 4 show the distributional impacts of the policy. 
Similar to the previously analyzed cap-and-dividend policy, while households in all income 
groups are better off as a result of the dividend, this policy benefits lower-income households 
relatively more. The average household in the lowest income decile experiences a net gain in 
consumer surplus equal to 1.64 percent of income after the lump-sum return of revenue, 
compared with a loss of 4.42 percent of income before the return of revenue.  
 
Figure 4. Cap-and-Dividend (Nontaxable) Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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In comparison with the first scenario, the nontaxable dividend option tends to lead to a 
slightly more equal distribution of the net burden across income groups. The lower-income 
households do not experience quite as large a gain, and the higher-income households do not 
incur quite as large a loss. This happens because of the differences in the marginal tax rates 
across income groups. When the dividend is taxed, the relative gain to the lower deciles is 
greater because of their lower marginal tax rates. In this scenario, where the dividends are 
untaxed, these tax rate differences do not play a role. The difference shows up in the Suits Index 
for the rebate, which at –0.33 is less negative than in our first policy scenario. Both cap-and-
dividend options are progressive, but the taxable dividend option is more progressive. 
Regional results are quite similar to the first scenario – although there is some variation 
across regions, it is not great for average households. However, some more substantial regional 
differences show up for low income households. 
4.2 Reducing Preexisting Taxes 
A prominent suggestion from the public finance literature is to direct revenues collected 
under federal climate policy to reduce preexisting taxes that distort behavior away from 
economic efficiency (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Goulder et 
al. 1999; Parry et al. 1999). Studies show that such an option improves the overall efficiency of 
the policy because it removes the distortions those preexisting taxes cause in factor markets. In 
fact, failure to reduce those taxes can impose a hidden cost of climate policy.12 If climate policy 
is more expensive than it otherwise needs to be, then this inevitably affects households in all 
income groups. Therefore, designing policy to be as cost-effective as possible can be thought of 
as an important component of addressing the impact on low-income households. 
Measuring the effect of interactions with other regulations and taxes and the benefits of 
revenue recycling requires a general equilibrium framework or linked partial equilibrium models 
that include labor or capital supply decisions. Dinan and Rogers (2002) include a reduced-form 
                                                 
12 Theory suggests that any tax or regulatory cost causes a difference between the value of marginal product and 
opportunity cost in the affected factor markets. By raising costs, a new regulation, such as climate policy, acts like a 
virtual tax by lowering the real wage, which causes a reduction in the supply of relevant factors, such as labor or 
capital. Moreover, a new regulatory cost exacerbates the inefficiency that arises from preexisting regulations and 
taxes, raising costs at an increasing rate. If revenue is used to reduce preexisting taxes, then this effect can be offset 
to a considerable degree. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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representation of the benefits of revenue recycling using estimates of the welfare loss in factor 
markets from Parry et al. (1999). We do not include the effects in factor markets, in part because 
the exact way in which those effects are distributed among households in different regions has 
not been studied previously. However, we do model the direct effect on household finances of 
using CO2 revenue to reduce the income tax, reduce the payroll tax, and augment the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, ignoring the welfare issues associated with changes in the supply of labor.  
4.2.1 Reducing Income Tax 
A reduction in the income tax could be implemented in many ways. In this scenario, we 
assume an overall reduction in tax collections in proportion to the amount paid by households in 
each income bracket. This is effectively like an equal reduction in average tax rates across all 
households. It disproportionately benefits the highest-income groups because they have the 
highest average and marginal rate, and the rate is applied to the most income. Nonetheless, this 
approach follows from the underlying theory that changes in labor supply affect economic 
growth most significantly if they involve those individuals with the highest value of marginal 
product, such as the highest wage. Thus this scenario is useful to analyze. 
The Congressional Budget Office (2005) reports the average tax burden of U.S. 
households by income decile (see Appendix F). We multiply this percentage by the amount of 
income earned by each decile to get a share of total income tax burden by decile. Finally, we 
distribute CO2 revenue proportional to each household’s estimated share of the total income tax 
burden.  
The fourth row of Table 3 and Figure 5 show the incidence of the policy. Lowest-income 
groups receive very little benefit from this approach to reducing taxes. Most of the benefit 
accrues to the highest-income deciles, and the average family in the top decile ends up with a net 
gain of $1,322 per year, or 0.74 percent of annual income. By contrast, the average family in the 
lowest-income decile incurs a net cost of $292, or 4.15 percent of income. The figure makes 
clear that the return of revenues to households has increasing importance as we move up the 
income distribution: the gap between the dark blue and light blue bars—that is, between the 
gross and net impacts on consumer surplus—increases as we move up the deciles. The average 
household in decile 8 would be almost indifferent between this option and the taxable cap-and-
dividend scenario; its net consumer surplus loss as a percent of income is 0.38 in the cap and 
dividend case and 0.30 in the income tax case. Households in higher-income deciles would 
prefer this approach; those in lower deciles would, on average, be better off with cap-and-
dividend. The Suits Index for this rebate is 0.18, indicating that the option is strongly regressive. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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The table in Figure 5 shows that, as in our first two policy options, the regional variation 
for an average household is quite small. In addition, the regional variation for poor households is 
not as pronounced as it was in the previous two policies. The national average loss for 
households in the bottom two deciles is $342 per year, or 3.35 percent of income. The highest 
average loss for this group occurs in the Ohio Valley, at $421, or 4.07 percent of income, and the 
lowest is in California, at $322, or 3.06 percent. This is a dollar range of only $99, compared 
with a range of $273 for the taxable cap-and-dividend scenario. This is mainly a result of the 
smaller amount of money going back to these lower income households in this scenario and 
some regional differences in income and income taxes paid.  
 
Figure 5. Reducing the Income Tax 
 
 
4.2.2 Reducing Payroll Tax 
Using CO2 allowance revenues to reduce payroll taxes such as Social Security is another 
option for “greening” the tax system. In addition to income taxes, employers are required to 
withhold one-half of each employee’s Social Security and Medicare tax requirements (equal to Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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12.4 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively). The employer then pays the other half; however, it is 
common to assume that this expense is passed on to employees in the form of lower wages. 
Together, these two taxes, also called Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes, are 
applied to the first $90,000 in wages for each employee.13 For this policy case we modeled a 12.4 
percent reduction in payroll taxes. Unfortunately, it is not easy to distinguish which member of 
the household earned what fraction of wage income in the BLS data.14 To represent households 
with multiple wage earners, we cap eligible wages at $135,000.  
Like the income tax reduction scenario, the payroll tax deduction makes for a net 
regressive CO2 policy. The distribution of net consumer surplus losses across the deciles is 
shown in the fifth row of Table 3 and in Figure 6. The bar graph illustrates that although the 
burden is reduced from rebating the revenues through reductions in this preexisting tax—that is, 
the light blue bars all lie below the dark blue ones—the distribution of the impacts across deciles 
remains virtually the same. Poor households are still disproportionately harmed by the policy. 
Households in the top three income deciles end up benefiting from this policy option: with the 
payroll tax deduction, the CO2 policy actually yields a net consumer surplus gain for average 
households in those deciles. Although the magnitude of the effects is different, directionally the 
results are quite similar to the income tax scenario in the preceding section. The Suits Index 
associated with the reduction in the payroll tax is essentially 0, indicating that this rebate is 
income neutral. However, given that the CO2 policy itself is regressive, the net effect of this 
program is also regressive. Regional results are similar to those for the income tax scenario – i.e., 
while there are some differences across regions, they are smaller than for the two cap and 
dividend scenarios. This holds true for the average household overall and the average household 
in the bottom two deciles. 
                                                 
13 The $90,000 cap was in effect in 2005, the middle of our sample period, and we use that figure in our analysis 
here. A slightly higher cap was in effect in 2006 in these deciles. 
14 Note the distinction between wages and income. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 6. Reducing the Payroll Tax 
 
 
4.2.3 Expanding Earned Income Tax Credit  
Greenstein et al. (2008) have suggested that revenues generated under a cap-and-trade 
program or a CO2 tax should be used to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit. The tax credit is 
available to families earning wages below a particular threshold.15 The amount of the credit falls 
as income rises, is higher for families with children, and is adjusted each year. For example, in 
2007, the credit for a family with two or more children was equal to 40 percent of the first 
$11,790 of earned income; for earnings beyond $15,399, the credit drops to 21 percent, and it 
falls to zero when earnings pass $37,782. In our policy scenario, we first estimate the current 
credit for each observation based on the 2006 parameters. We then take half of this estimate and 
                                                 
15 Here, note that we are distinguishing between wages and income. Although the tax credit does phase out at a 
given wage level, it is possible for a family’s total income to exceed that. For this reason, we see some families 
receiving the tax credit in every decile.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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redistribute it to each household, which is analogous to increasing the program by 50 percent. 
This fairly substantial expansion accounted for just 14 percent of total revenue raised by the CO2 
policy, leaving 86 percent to be distributed as per capita dividends. 
The distributional results for our Earned Income Tax Credit expansion policy are shown 
in the sixth row of Table 3 and in Figure 7. As expected, households in the lower-income deciles 
benefit the most from this policy. The average household in the first decile experiences a net 
consumer surplus gain of 4.56 percent of income. By contrast, the average household in the 
highest income decile earns a net consumer surplus loss of 0.57 percent of income, which is very 
close to the loss before redistribution of revenue, 0.91 percent of income. Comparing the dark 
and light blue bars in the graph indicates that the redistribution of revenues through the program 
dramatically changes the regressivity of the policy. The Suits Index is –0.47, making this policy 
the most progressive of the options we have analyzed here.  
 
Figure 7. Expanding the EITC 
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There is substantial variation in the regional impacts for poor households. As the table 
shows, the average consumer surplus gain for these households nationwide is $324, or 3.35 
percent of income, but the gain varies from $607 in Texas (5.86 percent of income) to only $108 
in the Northeast (1.18 percent of income). As with the other policy options, the impact for 
average households across regions shows less variability. One of the limitations with the 
modeling strategy we used in this scenario is that the effect of expanding EITC is conflated with 
the effect of the cap and dividend, since expansion of the EITC uses up only 17 percent of 
disbursable funds. If we developed an EITC policy to use all of the revenue, the progressivity of 
this option would likely be even stronger.  
4.3 Results Using Consumption Expenditures 
As we explained in Section 2, it has long been argued by economists that some measure 
of lifetime, or permanent, income is a better measure of ability to pay than is annual income. 
Since information on lifetime income is difficult to come by, however, many studies have used 
consumption as a proxy. Consumption has its own problems, but we show our results using 
consumption for purposes of comparison with our results based on annual income. Both results 
are in Figure 8, which shows the gross and net effect on consumer surplus as a percent of income 
(top panel) and as a percent of consumption (bottom panel). 
Clearly, all of the policy scenarios using annual consumption expenditures look much 
less regressive, both before and after return of the revenues, than they do using annual income. 
Pricing CO2 appears to have about an equal impact, in terms of consumer surplus loss as a 
percentage of consumption, across income deciles. Thus, the policy looks approximately 
proportional. Returning the revenues makes the policy appear progressive in most cases—that is, 
the graph shows that the lighter blue bars get larger as income increases. The only scenarios in 
which this does not hold are, as expected, the scenarios in which income or payroll taxes are 
reduced. These findings are consistent with those of others who have found that the regressivity 
of many taxes is muted when consumption is used in place of income. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Figure 8. Incidence of Policies across Income Deciles as Fraction of Income  
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5. Concluding Remarks  
Climate policy may impose important costs on the economy. For a cap-and-trade policy, 
the primary determinant of how these costs are distributed across the population is the allocation 
of CO2 allowances and dispensation of any auctioned CO2 revenue. The magnitude of the 
revenues generated from a full auction far outweighs the size of the resource costs and thus can 
go a long way to alleviating the burden imposed by higher energy and product prices. This paper 
has calculated the distributional effects of five alternative ways of distributing this revenue 
across two demographic dimensions, income and geography.  
We find the simplest approach to have merit on distributional grounds: returning 
revenues in a lump-sum manner in a so-called cap-and-dividend approach makes for an overall 
progressive policy. If the dividend, or rebate, is taxed, this option is slightly more progressive 
than if it is untaxed. Not surprisingly, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit is even more 
progressive. Reducing income or payroll taxes, however, is regressive. These two options benefit 
those households who pay a relatively higher share of these taxes and those households tend to 
be in the higher income categories.  
Regional differences among the options are most pronounced for lower income 
households. The average net consumer surplus loss, across all regions of the country, is 0.23 
percent of income (for all of the policies) and only varies by region from about 0 percent to 0.4 
percent. The average loss for the bottom two deciles shows a greater range across regions and 
varies by policy scenario. For example, the net consumer surplus gain for the bottom two deciles 
for the cap and (taxable) dividend scenario ranges from 1 percent of income to 3.8 percent of 
income. Nonetheless, the difference across regions for a given income grouping – even the 
bottom two deciles, where the difference is greatest – is less pronounced that the difference 
across policy scenarios. In other words, it matters less where a household lives than whether that 
household receives a lump-sum dividend or a reduction in its income tax.  
Our findings are specific to the policies we examine and it is important to emphasize 
exactly what those policies are, especially for our tax change scenarios. We reduced the income 
tax and the payroll tax proportionally across households; for the EITC, we expanded the program 
by 50 percent, which increased the credit received for those households who are currently 
eligible. There are obviously many other alternatives that can be examined and those alternatives 
could have different impacts. For example, the income tax could be reduced more for households 
below a particular income level and less for those above that level or the EITC income cut-off Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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could be raised. In addition, combinations of options, such as a partial lump-sum payment 
combined with a payroll tax reduction, might generate some interesting results. This was beyond 
our scope here. 
In addition, there are some other important issues that should be considered. First, 
expansion of the model to account for the important role played by labor and capital markets 
would be instructive. Second, even within our partial equilibrium framework, sensitivity analysis 
of some of our parameters, in particular, the elasticities used to calculate consumer surplus 
losses, would be helpful. Third, we welcome further evidence about the relationship between 
lifetime income and annual income (or consumption) as a measure of ability to pay. And finally, 
it would be useful for policy makers to see impacts by other demographic and regional measures. 
For example, state-level impacts would be interesting; also, incidence by family size and age are 
two possible ways to delve deeper into the incidence of climate policy.  
Although climate change is a long-run problem, climate policy has an important short-run 
political dynamic. Therefore, delivering compensation or finding ways to alleviate 
disproportional burdens of the policy seems especially important in the early years of climate 
policy. Our main message is that allocation of the value of the CO2 permits or the revenues from 
a CO2 auction is critical in determining who loses and who gains from climate policy and the 
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Appendix A: Observations by Region and After-Tax Income Decile  
Decile
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 T o t a l
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, 
MS, NC, SC, TN, VA
1327 1423 1434 1354 1371 1189 1230 1156 1315 1189 12988
CA CA 577 792 796 905 904 1001 962 1002 1196 1457 9592
TX TX 462 501 602 617 631 624 541 608 520 594 5700
FL FL 438 578 571 611 536 634 546 568 469 401 5352
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, OH, 
WV, WI
1247 1476 1764 1716 1567 1722 1754 1805 1814 1644 16509
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 593 840 961 966 926 889 1069 1061 1052 1268 9625
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 261 312 387 314 350 464 389 476 579 579 4111
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 454 443 469 534 587 584 697 591 573 590 5522
NY NY 405 443 345 391 444 407 456 465 531 599 4486
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 218 254 304 346 319 398 401 439 327 368 3374
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 350 434 485 509 574 486 495 503 481 457 4774
National 9751 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 9752 97519  
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Appendix B. Household Electricity (KWh) Consumption by Decile and Region 
Household Electricity (KWh) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
13,177 14,788 16,406 18,045 18,454 18,833 19,703 20,749 22,109 24,666 18,540
CA CA 4,818 5,567 5,809 6,309 6,874 7,224 7,931 9,021 10,680 14,106 8,441
TX TX 9,814 10,788 13,080 13,957 15,306 16,804 17,731 18,777 22,419 27,251 16,741
FL FL 11,000 12,443 14,187 15,134 14,501 16,791 17,438 18,946 22,098 26,070 16,606
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, OH, 
WV, WI
9,386 11,079 12,275 12,918 13,364 14,781 15,150 16,535 17,440 21,735 14,662
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 8,256 9,280 10,632 11,409 12,550 13,190 15,284 16,283 16,792 21,634 14,129
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 4,666 6,819 6,752 6,856 7,425 7,789 8,830 10,063 11,722 14,569 9,188
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 6,933 11,228 11,185 12,677 14,037 13,936 14,819 16,412 18,029 19,659 14,211
NY NY 5,139 6,126 5,995 7,710 8,921 8,263 9,327 10,170 11,936 14,635 9,204
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 6,749 7,759 9,311 10,446 10,926 13,234 14,498 14,686 14,572 22,878 13,066
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 8,990 10,557 10,053 12,010 12,821 13,838 15,194 15,932 17,139 20,939 13,856
National 7,313 9,828 11,138 12,305 12,859 13,656 14,572 15,585 16,899 20,298 13,445Resources for the Future    Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Appendix C. Household Gasoline (Gallons) Consumption by Decile and Region  
Household Gasoline (Gallons) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
424 585 778 952 1,026 1,206 1,341 1,387 1,692 1,631 1,082
CA CA 356 598 758 885 987 1,136 1,304 1,410 1,680 1,857 1,198
TX TX 543 679 832 1,082 1,216 1,275 1,431 1,533 1,715 1,887 1,235
FL FL 494 521 662 860 976 1,064 1,150 1,373 1,614 1,536 1,009
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, OH, 
WV, WI
373 464 658 822 930 1,062 1,305 1,397 1,644 1,743 1,070
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 403 366 537 752 815 985 1,119 1,268 1,339 1,562 971
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 379 481 634 711 841 934 1,114 1,309 1,454 1,654 1,046
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 513 458 670 820 981 1,062 1,160 1,298 1,403 1,555 1,029
NY NY 332 345 432 625 806 926 954 1,246 1,336 1,457 894
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 420 513 678 748 945 1,004 1,280 1,363 1,444 1,806 1,078
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 395 496 644 744 846 971 1,210 1,266 1,408 1,662 979
National 360 492 672 829 962 1,089 1,244 1,361 1,564 1,682 1,025Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Appendix D. Household Natural Gas (tcf) Consumption by Decile and Region 
Household Natural Gas (tcf) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
30 34 30 31 30 41 33 46 60 74 40
CA CA 25 25 28 32 34 37 39 45 53 67 41
TX TX 20 21 22 25 27 28 28 32 37 58 30
F L F L 2224234236 3
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, OH, 
WV, WI
49 59 64 64 75 80 80 89 97 131 80
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 35 44 43 51 58 53 57 59 77 101 60
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 23 38 39 40 32 49 34 39 40 54 40
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 15 27 31 35 40 47 63 64 70 84 50
NY NY 22 34 26 31 36 46 45 51 63 67 44
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 36 40 52 62 81 81 90 98 110 137 82
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 28 35 37 40 40 46 52 65 64 92 50
National 22 31 35 38 41 47 48 55 63 82 46  
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Appendix E. Household Fuel Oil (Gallons) Consumption by Decile and Region 
Household Fuel Oil (Gallons) Consumption by Decile and Region
Decile 99
R e g i o n S t a t e s 123456789 1 0 Mean
Southeast AL, AR, DC, GA, LA, MS, 
NC, SC, TN, VA
43 40 52 42 53 55 38 52 67 83 52
C A C A 8 1 21 61 51 22 73 45 33 04 2 2 7
TX TX 10 16 15 10 16 27 23 26 18 18 18
FL FL 9 14 5 9 13 8 16 15 30 28 14
Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, OH, 
WV, WI
23 34 34 50 54 44 54 40 86 64 49
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 130 168 146 130 110 131 162 156 128 207 149
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 175 353 242 374 395 233 381 400 505 667 397
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 20 25 22 47 39 62 38 66 58 58 45
NY NY 49 229 95 163 212 154 280 266 305 514 244
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 9 22 45 8 11 26 34 18 50 67 30
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 22 18 19 30 16 11 20 38 7 14 20
National 38 71 59 70 77 73 91 93 114 148 83  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 
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Appendix F. Tax and Stock Ownership Inputs  








1 ‐15% 4% 0.80%
2 3% 4% 0.50%
3 11% 10% 0.90%
4 16% 10% 1.70%
5 17% 14% 2.40%
6 19% 14% 4.20%
7 22% 17% 5.70%
8 27% 17% 7.00%
9 30% 23% 12.10%
10 36% 27% 64.70%
Sources: Supporting analysis for Cogressional Budget Office (2005); 
Department of Treasury (2007)
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Appendix G. Consumer Surplus Loss After Carbon Policy   
Consumer Surplus Loss After Carbon Policy
Region Decile Avg Income Gasoline Electricity Natural Gas Fuel Oil Indirect Total Loss
Southeast 1 1.6 97 90 36 11 109 343
Southeast 2 1.9 134 101 40 11 175 460
Southeast 3 2.2 178 112 36 14 206 544
Southeast 4 2.3 217 123 37 11 244 632
Southeast 5 2.6 234 125 36 14 287 697
Southeast 6 2.7 275 127 49 14 338 805
Southeast 7 2.8 306 134 39 10 406 896
Southeast 8 2.9 317 141 56 14 466 993
Southeast 9 3.1 387 150 71 17 586 1,212
Southeast 10 3.3 373 168 88 22 820 1,470
Southeast Avg 2.5 247 126 48 14 354 789
California 1 1.8 81 28 30 2 164 305
California 2 2.1 137 32 29 3 198 400
California 3 2.5 173 33 33 4 243 487
California 4 2.7 202 36 38 4 323 604
California 5 2.9 226 40 41 3 331 640
California 6 3.1 260 42 44 7 408 760
California 7 2.9 298 46 46 9 487 886
California 8 3.1 322 52 54 14 570 1,012
California 9 3.5 384 62 63 8 708 1,224
California 10 3.4 424 82 80 11 1,020 1,616
California Avg 2.9 274 49 49 7 502 881
Texas 1 2.1 124 98 24 3 128 377
Texas 2 2.2 155 108 26 4 166 459
Texas 3 2.6 190 130 27 4 224 575
Texas 4 2.8 247 141 30 3 274 696
Texas 5 2.8 278 154 33 4 343 812
Texas 6 2.7 291 166 34 7 375 873
Texas 7 3.1 327 179 33 6 454 999
Texas 8 3.2 350 190 38 7 480 1,065
Texas 9 3.3 392 225 45 5 694 1,360
Texas 10 3.1 431 270 69 5 875 1,650
Texas Avg 2.8 282 168 36 5 406 897
Florida 1 1.5 113 102 2 2 145 365
Florida 2 1.6 119 116 3 4 190 431
Florida 3 2.1 151 133 3 1 236 524
Florida 4 2.3 197 141 5 2 282 627
Florida 5 2.5 223 136 3 4 306 671
Florida 6 2.7 243 157 3 2 360 765
Florida 7 2.8 263 162 5 4 414 847
Florida 8 2.9 314 177 3 4 497 995
Florida 9 2.9 369 206 4 8 585 1,172
Florida 10 3.0 351 243 8 7 860 1,468
Florida Avg 2.4 230 155 4 4 374 766
Ohio Valley 1 1.5 85 130 58 6 125 405
Ohio Valley 2 1.7 106 154 70 9 158 497
Ohio Valley 3 1.9 150 169 76 9 190 594
Ohio Valley 4 2.2 188 178 77 13 253 709
Ohio Valley 5 2.4 213 186 89 14 295 798
Ohio Valley 6 2.6 243 204 96 12 339 893
Ohio Valley 7 2.8 298 210 95 14 409 1,026
Ohio Valley 8 3.1 319 231 107 11 474 1,141
Ohio Valley 9 3.2 375 244 116 22 578 1,336
Ohio Valley 10 3.4 398 303 157 17 866 1,740
Ohio Valley Avg 2.5 244 204 95 13 378 935
Mid‐Atlantic 1 1.6 92 93 42 34 139 401
Mid‐Atlantic 2 1.6 84 105 53 44 155 441
Mid‐Atlantic 3 1.8 123 120 51 38 205 537
Mid‐Atlantic 4 2.0 172 130 60 34 251 647
Mid‐Atlantic 5 2.3 186 141 70 29 285 710
Mid‐Atlantic 6 2.4 225 150 63 34 345 817
Mid‐Atlantic 7 2.9 256 170 68 42 377 914
Mid‐Atlantic 8 2.8 290 183 71 41 454 1,039
Mid‐Atlantic 9 3.2 306 190 92 34 531 1,152
Mid‐Atlantic 10 3.2 357 250 121 54 840 1,623
Mid‐Atlantic Avg 2.5 222 160 72 39 388 881
Note: Deciles constructed at the national level. All positive welfare losses reflect decreases in consumer surplus.  Resources for the Future   




Consumer Surplus Loss After Carbon Policy
Region Decile Avg Income Gasoline Electricity Natural Gas Fuel Oil Indirect Total Loss
Northeast 1 1.299 87 51 28 46 167 377
Northeast 2 1.673 110 71 45 93 194 513
Northeast 3 1.897 145 72 47 64 223 550
Northeast 4 2.010 163 73 48 98 261 643
Northeast 5 2.234 192 78 38 104 304 717
Northeast 6 2.317 213 84 58 61 350 767
Northeast 7 2.697 255 94 41 100 444 933
Northeast 8 2.935 299 106 46 105 491 1,048
Northeast 9 3.064 332 123 48 133 623 1,260
Northeast 10 3.200 378 156 65 175 917 1,691
Northeast Avg 2.470 239 98 48 104 448 937
Northwest 1 1.573 117 24 18 5 147 312
Northwest 2 1.799 105 38 32 7 215 397
Northwest 3 1.921 153 38 37 6 269 503
Northwest 4 2.311 187 44 42 12 266 551
Northwest 5 2.557 224 48 47 10 384 714
Northwest 6 2.682 243 48 56 16 390 753
Northwest 7 3.001 265 51 75 10 480 881
Northwest 8 3.212 296 56 77 17 526 972
Northwest 9 3.368 321 61 83 15 631 1,111
Northwest 10 3.263 355 67 101 15 991 1,530
Northwest Avg 2.636 235 49 59 12 448 803
New York 1 1.521 76 83 26 13 137 335
New York 2 1.752 79 99 40 60 178 457
New York 3 2.171 99 97 32 25 212 465
New York 4 2.396 143 125 37 43 261 609
New York 5 2.500 184 145 43 56 308 736
New York 6 2.432 212 135 55 40 352 794
New York 7 2.860 218 151 53 73 398 894
New York 8 3.084 285 164 61 70 454 1,033
New York 9 3.292 305 194 75 80 533 1,187
New York 10 3.349 333 238 80 135 834 1,620
New York Avg 2.601 204 149 52 64 393 864
Plains 1 1.532 96 61 43 2 139 342
Plains 2 1.508 117 73 48 6 155 399
Plains 3 1.845 155 87 62 12 208 525
Plains 4 2.029 171 96 74 2 236 578
Plains 5 2.135 216 102 96 3 343 760
Plains 6 2.226 229 124 96 7 384 841
Plains 7 2.868 292 136 107 9 472 1,016
Plains 8 3.030 311 139 116 5 476 1,047
Plains 9 2.951 330 139 131 13 582 1,194
Plains 10 3.250 413 218 163 18 1,201 2,012
Plains Avg 2.427 246 123 98 8 447 922
Mountains 1 1.771 90 91 33 6 157 377
Mountains 2 1.998 113 108 42 5 205 474
Mountains 3 2.132 147 103 44 5 253 552
Mountains 4 2.338 170 123 48 8 295 644
Mountains 5 2.490 193 132 48 4 344 722
Mountains 6 2.726 222 142 55 3 403 825
Mountains 7 2.909 276 158 63 5 484 986
Mountains 8 3.091 289 165 78 10 504 1,046
Mountains 9 3.231 322 176 76 2 677 1,253
Mountains 10 3.278 380 217 110 4 903 1,613
Mountains Avg 2.621 224 143 60 5 428 859
National 1 1.555 82 70 26 10 122 311
National 2 1.827 112 95 37 19 171 433
National 3 2.104 153 108 42 15 216 535
National 4 2.330 189 119 45 18 265 638
National 5 2.546 220 124 49 20 308 721
National 6 2.652 249 133 56 19 360 817
National 7 2.885 284 142 58 24 424 932
National 8 3.023 311 154 66 25 486 1,042
National 9 3.229 357 166 75 30 607 1,235
National 10 3.267 384 201 98 39 899 1,621
National Avg 2.542 234 131 55 22 386 829
Note: Deciles constructed at the national level. All positive welfare losses reflect decreases in consumer surplus.
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Appendix H. Net Welfare Loss Across Scenarios  







(Non‐Taxable) Reduce Income Tax Reduce Payroll Tax  Expand EITC
Southeast 1 7,174 343 (285) (96) 325 307 (313)
Southeast 2 15,359 460 (182) (70) 419 355 (400)
Southeast 3 23,096 544 (112) (50) 402 316 (374)
Southeast 4 31,039 632 (41) (11) 441 255 (162)
Southeast 5 39,548 697 (49) (29) 361 194 (42)
Southeast 6 49,370 805 66 70 384 146 157
Southeast 7 61,363 896 157 135 250 45 259
Southeast 8 77,159 993 288 212 184 (101) 390
Southeast 9 100,969 1,212 463 353 (207) (230) 581
Southeast 10 182,750 1,470 756 569 (1,473) (436) 870
Southeast Avg 56,528 789 92 99 127 98 74
California 1 7,537 305 (391) (182) 286 269 (435)
California 2 15,457 400 (292) (171) 359 298 (472)
California 3 23,019 487 (260) (189) 345 265 (570)
California 4 30,800 604 (176) (141) 413 282 (364)
California 5 39,786 640 (179) (157) 304 160 (183)
California 6 49,656 760 (84) (79) 340 142 10
California 7 61,313 886 103 79 240 94 189
California 8 77,381 1,012 249 167 203 (52) 361
California 9 100,041 1,224 392 270 (195) (150) 523
California 10 178,631 1,616 870 674 (1,327) (255) 987
California Avg 69,317 881 106 84 (2) 66 109
Texas 1 7,558 377 (438) (193) 358 334 (567)
Texas 2 15,344 459 (283) (153) 418 343 (646)
Texas 3 23,135 575 (223) (147) 433 320 (690)
Texas 4 31,015 696 (119) (82) 504 298 (387)
Texas 5 39,824 812 26 46 477 296 40
Texas 6 49,621 873 126 131 453 241 206
Texas 7 61,314 999 171 146 353 189 280
Texas 8 76,424 1,065 270 184 256 (3) 375
Texas 9 99,838 1,360 561 444 (59) (79) 680
Texas 10 171,804 1,650 981 806 (1,294) (269) 1,093
Texas Avg 58,586 897 118 124 189 165 52
Florida 1 7,801 365 (231) (52) 346 334 (251)
Florida 2 15,500 431 (98) (5) 390 357 (187)
Florida 3 23,112 524 (121) (60) 382 311 (353)
Florida 4 31,095 627 (20) 9 436 336 (96)
Florida 5 39,241 671 (31) (12) 336 211 13
Florida 6 49,143 765 26 30 345 187 129
Florida 7 61,766 847 96 73 201 58 212
Florida 8 76,941 995 276 198 186 10 381
Florida 9 100,195 1,172 467 363 (248) (207) 579
Florida 10 173,488 1,468 813 641 (1,475) (343) 922
Florida Avg 54,325 766 96 101 143 144 109
Ohio Valley 1 7,413 405 (187) (9) 386 369 (200)
Ohio Valley 2 15,518 497 (65) 33 456 410 (211)
Ohio Valley 3 23,115 594 11 67 452 397 (158)
Ohio Valley 4 31,161 709 84 112 518 397 (15)
Ohio Valley 5 39,673 798 112 130 462 338 112
Ohio Valley 6 49,639 893 181 186 472 267 256
Ohio Valley 7 61,878 1,026 269 246 380 200 372
Ohio Valley 8 76,991 1,141 371 288 332 43 492
Ohio Valley 9 99,602 1,336 573 461 (83) (73) 691
Ohio Valley 10 177,756 1,740 1,008 816 (1,203) (152) 1,131
Ohio Valley Avg 60,237 935 252 242 213 211 267
Mid‐Atlantic 1 7,692 401 (214) (29) 382 370 (231)
Mid‐Atlantic 2 15,463 441 (89) 4 400 372 (231)
Mid‐Atlantic 3 22,794 537 (19) 34 395 345 (183)
Mid‐Atlantic 4 31,051 647 61 87 456 303 (21)
Mid‐Atlantic 5 39,436 710 71 88 375 234 100
Mid‐Atlantic 6 49,579 817 145 149 396 192 211
Mid‐Atlantic 7 61,863 914 151 128 268 86 261
Mid‐Atlantic 8 77,081 1,039 337 261 230 (109) 450
Mid‐Atlantic 9 101,109 1,152 390 278 (267) (258) 504
Mid‐Atlantic 10 182,398 1,623 928 746 (1,320) (296) 1,044
Mid‐Atlantic Avg 66,037 881 222 205 68 91 246     
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(Non‐Taxable) Reduce Income Tax Reduce Payroll Tax  Expand EITC
Northeast 1 6,974 377 (132) 21 358 350 (123)
Northeast 2 15,503 513 (43) 54 472 445 (94)
Northeast 3 22,909 550 (24) 30 408 349 (232)
Northeast 4 31,022 643 66 92 452 357 (44)
Northeast 5 39,823 717 88 104 381 232 113
Northeast 6 49,999 767 128 132 346 56 209
Northeast 7 61,157 933 215 194 287 71 321
Northeast 8 77,414 1,048 322 244 239 (47) 436
Northeast 9 101,309 1,260 527 420 (160) (171) 644
Northeast 10 181,083 1,691 997 814 (1,252) (256) 1,113
Northeast Avg 69,702 937 285 259 59 83 321
Northwest 1 6,981 312 (304) (119) 293 252 (353)
Northwest 2 15,481 397 (201) (97) 355 285 (371)
Northwest 3 23,603 503 (78) (23) 362 223 (290)
Northwest 4 31,225 551 (112) (82) 360 173 (244)
Northwest 5 39,551 714 (6) 13 379 228 29
Northwest 6 49,921 753 14 18 332 137 87
Northwest 7 61,763 881 82 58 235 58 189
Northwest 8 77,098 972 178 92 164 (28) 295
Northwest 9 100,080 1,111 306 188 (308) (228) 410
Northwest 10 176,106 1,530 821 636 (1,414) (292) 940
Northwest Avg 61,572 803 91 80 58 67 104
New York 1 6,868 335 (261) (82) 316 295 (282)
New York 2 15,735 457 (125) (23) 416 358 (262)
New York 3 23,294 465 (193) (131) 323 243 (428)
New York 4 31,088 609 (79) (48) 418 273 (224)
New York 5 39,497 736 32 50 400 278 50
New York 6 50,041 794 123 127 374 199 211
New York 7 61,583 894 133 110 248 59 234
New York 8 77,592 1,033 271 188 224 (37) 390
New York 9 101,015 1,187 400 285 (232) (176) 529
New York 10 191,319 1,620 892 702 (1,324) (317) 1,015
New York Avg 66,930 864 165 151 48 89 183
Plains 1 7,223 342 (258) (78) 323 309 (272)
Plains 2 15,404 399 (102) (15) 357 285 (255)
Plains 3 23,279 525 (34) 19 383 285 (221)
Plains 4 31,075 578 (4) 22 387 190 (176)
Plains 5 39,453 760 159 175 424 288 144
Plains 6 49,864 841 227 231 421 199 288
Plains 7 61,592 1,016 253 230 370 102 349
Plains 8 76,723 1,047 298 217 239 (78) 391
Plains 9 98,620 1,194 489 385 (225) (220) 602
Plains 10 181,054 2,012 1,307 1,121 (931) 125 1,413
Plains Avg 63,131 922 273 257 163 131 278
Mountains 1 7,115 377 (317) (108) 358 336 (400)
Mountains 2 15,155 474 (190) (74) 433 373 (420)
Mountains 3 22,801 552 (93) (32) 410 299 (395)
Mountains 4 31,050 644 (27) 3 453 278 (139)
Mountains 5 39,393 722 21 40 386 221 69
Mountains 6 49,655 825 73 78 405 176 185
Mountains 7 61,315 986 212 188 340 168 306
Mountains 8 76,844 1,046 282 199 237 (34) 400
Mountains 9 99,927 1,253 481 368 (166) (150) 608
Mountains 10 170,924 1,613 901 715 (1,330) (162) 1,006
Mountains Avg 58,202 859 143 141 159 146 136
National 1 7,030 311 (299) (116) 292 273 (320)
National 2 15,372 433 (174) (67) 392 340 (329)
National 3 23,038 535 (102) (42) 393 316 (331)
National 4 31,036 638 (31) (1) 446 298 (164)
National 5 39,553 721 4 23 386 245 17
National 6 49,596 817 86 90 397 186 165
National 7 61,558 932 164 141 286 109 266
National 8 77,074 1,042 294 213 233 (32) 405
National 9 100,267 1,235 463 350 (184) (162) 581
National 10 178,677 1,621 912 726 (1,322) (255) 1,027
National Avg 58,321 829 132 132 132 132 132
Note: Deciles constructed at the national level. All negative welfare losses reflect a net increase
in welfare after CO2 revenues are redistributed.  